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1. Introduction 
In the context of a growing market with consumer network externalities, the speed of a new 
product’s market penetration (i.e. diffusion) is an important summary measure of how well the 
market is performing for potential consumers.  Delays in uptake can result in large welfare 
losses.
1
  When the market is regulated, it is particularly important to understand how the various 
potential regulatory levers (e.g. price, number of firms, public ownership) affect the diffusion 
process.  As penetration approaches saturation, usage becomes the more important indicator of 
market performance, but in this paper we focus on the central period of diffusion in which 
average market penetration across the more developed economies rose from less than 2% to 
nearly 97% over 16 years.  
Like any other product, the demand for mobile phone services is influenced by a range of 
marketing and technical factors that constitute the overall product ‘offer’.  This offer includes 
price level, price structure (e.g. cost of sending relative to receiving a call), reach (geographic 
coverage) and reliability.  Individual elements of the product offer are difficult to observe and 
measure on a consistent basis either internationally or over time.  Furthermore, the optimal 
balance in the offer can be sensitive to national idiosyncrasies.  In fact, one of the theoretical 
virtues of a competitive market is that it creates incentives for firms to respond to these 
idiosyncrasies and to provide the most attractive offer to consumers. This leads us to focus on the 
structural characteristics of the market that drive competition.  The aim of this paper is to 
identify those structural features that are associated with the competitive environment which 
maximises the rate of diffusion of mobile telephony through the population.  
Mobile network penetration has been expanding rapidly in recent years, though there are 
signs it is reaching maturity in the advanced countries.  We employ a panel of 29 OECD 
countries and China over the period 1991-2006.  We include China because of its scale and 
economic growth at the time, but we also test for robustness using the OECD-only sample.
2
  This 
period covers the core of the penetration phase in each market.
3
 
                                               
1 See Hausman (1997). 
2 The Chinese mobile network market has grown fast but it is not immediately clear whether this is a distinct 
phenomenon or if it is following a similar pattern to OECD countries conditional on its market structure.  As the 
market with the highest number of mobile phone subscribers and the largest market potential, China also provides a 
robustness check on our core relationship between structure and diffusion.  
3
 In contrast, fixed-line markets have stagnated with a national average fixed-line penetration in our sample 
growing slowly to just under 51% in 2000 then shrinking (see Table 1 below). 
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We focus on three structural features: the number of firms; ownership (i.e. privatization); and 
the existence of an independent industry regulator.  Earlier work on telecom market penetration 
(including fixed line) focused on demographic and technology factors, privatization, first new 
entry and the early part of the diffusion process.
4
  The latter two limitations appear to be 
important because, by using data that more completely covers the core diffusion years for the 
countries in our sample and distinguishing between different numbers of firms, we find a non-
monotonic effect of market structure.
5
  Thus, while previous work has typically found that 
opening the market beyond monopoly is beneficial, it provides little guidance for important 
competition policy issues such as the number of operators to be licensed or merger regulation.  
The previous empirical literature also has little to say about regulatory institutions.  Our main 
contributions are to distinguish the fine-grained effects of each extra entrant and of an 
independent regulator, and to estimate our model over the core years of the diffusion process.
6
  
Having identified the key structural features associated with rapid diffusion, we go on to ask 
whether the effect of a more competitive structure works mainly through the average price level 
as distinct from non-price-level elements in the offer.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we review some 
related literature on competition, ownership and regulation in telecoms markets.  Section 3 sets 
out the econometric methodology and Section 4 describes the data.  Section 5 presents and 
discusses the empirical results.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Competition and regulation in mobile telecommunications 
We identify three structural dimensions to telecommunications competition: the number of 
networks; private (versus state) ownership; and the existence and independence of an industry 
regulator.  
A number of studies of mainly fixed line telecom markets have found that ‘competition’ is 
associated with higher penetration, productive efficiency, lower service price and better service 
                                               
4 For work on fixed line penetration, see for example: Ros (1999, 2003); Wallsten (2001, 2004); Fink et al. 
(2001); McNary (2001); Li and Xu (2002, 2004); Gasmi et al. (2006). The effect of competition has been tested 
using either a binary dummy variable (e.g., Ros, 1999, 2003; Fink et al., 2001) or indirect proxies of competition 
from other telecom segments (e.g., Li and Xu, 2002, 2004; Wallsten, 2001, 2004).   Work on mobile penetration has 
investigated the early stages of diffusion and focused on technological constraints, technology ‘generations’, 
industry standards, and entry regulation (e.g. Gruber and Verboven, 2001a and 2001b, whose data covers the period 
1984-97).   Our work is most closely related to the latter. 
5 The number of mobile networks is largely regulated due to spectrum scarcity but we later investigate possible 
endogeneity. 
6 More broadly, there appears to be little econometric research on the relationship between industrial organization 
and the uptake of consumer goods in other markets. 
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quality.  However, these early studies are unable to address questions relating to the extent of 
oligopolistic competition.  Importantly, only the early part of the diffusion process was 
observable in the data and there was very little experience of other than monopoly and duopoly 
market structures.  They mainly use either a binary competition variable
7
 or indirect proxies from 
other telecom segments.
8
  Gruber and Verboven (2001a, 2001b) include a duopoly dummy 
variable which they find to be statistically significant but quantitatively small.  Liikanen et al. 
(2004) include two market structure variables: the number of firms and a 3-firm Herfindahl 
index.  Both are entered linearly and neither is statistically significant.  The most recent 
observation in these papers is 1998 which, as shown in the next section, is still early in the 
diffusion process.   
Our empirical model allows for non-monotonicity in the relationship between market 
structure and diffusion.  Given the existence of switching costs between network operators, 
including pecuniary network externalities that can be created by the price structure in mobile 
telephony (e.g. on-net calls may be charged at a discount to off-net), there are incentives to 
compete for the market.  This may result in a relatively small number of firms being sufficient 
for strong competition.  Indeed, it is possible that if there are ‘too many’ operators, they may 
have a reduced incentive to invest in their network to achieve the highest quality.  Consequently, 
we need to allow for possible non-monotonicity in the relationship between the number of firms 
and consumer uptake. 
It would be important to take account of the endogeneity of market structure if there was free 
entry and exit.  In particular, as the market grows, we normally expect that more firms may enter 
profitably without sacrificing substantial economies of scale.  However, the entry of mobile 
networks is tightly controlled by licensing, and the number of licences is chosen by the 
government or regulator.
9
  Nevertheless, we test for a relationship between the number of 
networks and market size as a check on the exogeneity of market structure because the regulator 
may be influenced by market size in determining the number of licences.  Anticipating our 
results, we find no evidence that market structure is other than exogenous.   
The received evidence on ownership is that the success or failure of privatization is highly 
dependent on political and economic environments in general and the post-privatization 
                                               
7 E.g. Ros (1999, 2003), Fink et al (2001).  Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) do measure competition by a continuous 
variable:  the market share of new entrants. 
8 See, e.g. Li and Xu (2002, 2004); Wallsten (2001, 2004).    
9 See, for example, Gruber and Verboven (2001a or 2001b).  Mergers are also regulated though they may be more 
likely to be approved if the market is perceived as sufficiently competitive.  Mergers were not a substantial issue in 
the period and countries in our sample. 
- 3 - 
 
regulatory framework in particular.
10
  A survey by Megginson and Netter (2001) suggests that, 
on balance, deregulation and liberalization in the wider telecom sector are associated with 
significant improvements in performance and efficiency, but the impact of privatization alone is 
less clear.  This general finding is supported by fixed-line telecom studies that have tried to 
identify the characteristics of regulatory institutions which determine the quality of regulatory 
governance.
11
  They find consistently that the existence of a strong and independent regulator is 
a key institutional element that tends to be associated with higher levels of certain performance 
measures (including fixed-line penetration).  Beyond the general regulatory functions (e.g. 
preventing anticompetitive behaviour), the existence of an independent regulator signals the 
credibility of a government’s commitment to private investments and the government’s 
propensity to undertake effective pro-competition policies.
12
  Following the literature, we define 
an ‘independent regulator’ as one which is separated from industrial operators and other 
governmental bodies, backed by legislation rather than executive decree and able to make 
decisions independently. 
The regulatory relationship is different if firms are publicly owned because there is more 
likely to be a legislative or heavy lobbying response to regulatory decisions that are seen to harm 
public enterprises.  This suggests we should test for a regulatory effect that depends on 
ownership.   
The effectiveness of an independent regulator also depends on market structure.  With a 
monopoly provider, it is particularly difficult for the regulator to overcome its fundamental 
asymmetric information problem.  With two or more providers, a wider range of regulatory 
techniques becomes possible (e.g. yardstick competition).  Thus, although regulation may 
become less necessary as the number of providers increases, it may also become more effective – 
at least up to the point that it is no longer necessary. 
 
3. Econometric specification 
Mobile network penetration is encouraged by consumer adoption externalities and 
constrained by market saturation.  The balance of these two effects means that it follows a classic 
                                               
10 See Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996); Ramamurti (2000); Villalonga (2000); Yarrow (1986); North (1990). 
11 See, for example, Stern and Holder (1999); Gutierrez and Berg (2000); Gual and Trillas (2003); Gutierrez 
(2003a, 2003b); Cubbin and Stern (2006); Gasmi et al. (2006); Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005).   Exceptionally, 
Maiorano and Stern (2007) use data from low and middle-income countries over a 15-year period of 1990-2004 to 
investigate the relationship between regulatory institutions and performance in the mobile telecommunications 
sector. However, their results are mixed and do not take account of market structure. 
12 See Armstrong and Sappington (2006); Ramamurti (2000); Villalonga (2000); Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996).  
 
- 4 - 
 
S-shaped epidemic growth curve (see Fig. 2 below).  We therefore adopt the standard logistic 
specification for our empirical model.
13
  This implies that, for example, an increase in 
competition will have a greater percentage point impact on penetration when around half the 
population has adopted a mobile network, as compared with when the product is either new and 
trying to gain traction in the market, or mature and nearing market saturation.   
More specifically, let 
itMobPen denote the number of people (per 100 inhabitants) that have 
adopted a mobile network service in country i at time t.  Let *iM  denote the full saturation level 
of mobile network adoption (also as a percentage of the population).  If the growth rate of 
penetration is proportional to the proportion of the market that is as yet unserved, with the factor 
of proportion being, bit, we have:   
*
1 exp( ( ))
i
it
it it
M
MobPen
a b t

  
                                                                                                       (1)          
ita  shifts the diffusion curve forwards or backwards without changing its basic shape.  We return 
to this below.  Rearrangement of (1) provides the following model for estimation:  
*
ln itit it it i it
it
MobPen
y a b t u
M MobPen

 
     
 
                                                                                    (2)                                   
where iu  is a country specific error (i.e. time invariant unobserved heterogeneity for each 
country i);
14
 and it  is a standard white noise error term.  The factors determining the timing and 
speed of diffusion are specified as:
15
 
0
1
n n j j
it i it it it
n j J
a D x   

 
       
0
1
n n j j
it i it it it
n j J
b D x   

 
       
0
i  is the individual fixed effect for each country i, and is determined by each country’s initial 
position of network adoption.    is the maximum number of firms observed.  nit  is the set of 
market structure dummies equal to one when the number of firms equals n, jitD  is a set of J 
regulatory and ownership dummy variables (including interactions) and itx is a vector of 
continuously measured variables that influence diffusion (in particular, consumer prosperity). 
                                               
13 See Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961) for early analysis of the logistic growth curve, and Geroski (2000) 
for an evaluation of its merits.  
14 This is determined by unobserved demographic, social, political and technological factors. 
15 This follows Gruber and Verboven (2001b). 
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Following Gruber and Verboven (2001b) we impose restrictions on the coefficients of 
discrete (dummy) variables such that there are no sharp jumps in penetration (i.e. penetration 
should be the same immediately after entry as it was immediately before entry or privatisation or 
regulatory independence).  They only consider a single entry event and we generalise the 
parameter constraints necessary to avoid discontinuities.  We later test this set of restrictions.  
Write niT  as the year of entry of the n’th firm in country i.  Penetration is zero immediately 
before entry, 0 0 1i it i it ix x T         , and the same immediately after, which implies 
1 1 1
iT   .  Full derivation is in Appendix E.  Substituting these restrictions into the general 
diffusion equation and again assuming no jump in penetration on second entry, this further 
requires 
2 1 2 1 2 2
i i iT T T       .  Continuing the pattern, we obtain the general restriction for 
smooth transitions: 
1
1
1
n
n k k k n n
i i i
k
T T T  



 
     
 
 .  Substituting into (2), we have 
0 1
1
n n j j j
it it it i i it i i it
n j J
y N D t T x t T u    

 
                  
                               
 (3) 
where 1
1
n n n k n n
it it i it i i
k n
N t T T T


 
 
            
 
 .  Note that for all 
1n
it T
 , 1n n nit i iN T T
    .  
Thus, the history of earlier market structures matters because it provides the starting point from 
which market penetration grows in the new competitive environment. 
The intuition behind the construction of our market structure variables, nitN , is illustrated in 
Figure 2.  yit is forced to start at zero when the market opens at 
1
it T . This locates the diffusion 
curve for monopoly.  The second term in 1itN  locks in the level of mobile penetration achieved 
when the second firm enters.  The duopoly diffusion curve is constrained to locate such that 
ity  
is the same at 2itT  as for the monopoly curve at that time.  The duopoly curve is steeper if 
duopoly diffusion is faster than under monopoly.  The rate of diffusion may also fall with entry 
as illustrated in the figure with the entry of the fourth firm.   
Fig. 1 near here 
The j j
it iD t T    variables in equation (3) follow directly from the simple restriction of 
smooth transition at the time of discrete events.  Applied to privatisation and independent 
regulation, we have  Prviit TtPrvPrvT   and  IRiit TtIndRegIndRegT  .  As discussed in 
section 2, we also investigate interactions between independent regulation, privatisation and 
market structure.  Each of these is similarly specified in relation to elapsed time.  
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Finally, we allow for the underlying rate of diffusion to depend on the date of opening of the 
market: 
0 0
1i
i
t
t T
   

.  0   implies catch-up, as more recently opened markets grow 
faster than early ones, with the catch-up effect declining over time.
16
  Noting that 1
1
n
it i
n
N t T


  , 
we need to drop one variable from the estimation to avoid perfect multicollinearity.  We 
substitute for 1itN  in order to focus on market structure effects relative to monopoly.  Writing 
0 0 1    , we therefore estimate: 
1 1 1
2
n n j j j
it it it i i it i i it
n j J
y N D t T t T t x t T u      

 
  
                           
   
   (4)  
 
4. Data and measurement 
The dependent variable is mobile network penetration (MobPen) measured by the number of 
mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants as reported by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) for our panel of 30 countries over 16 years (1991-2006).  
Cross-country averages are reported in Table 1 alongside fixed line penetration to provide 
perspective.  The cross-country range of penetration rates and average growth curve are shown in 
Figure 2.  Table 1 also shows fixed line penetration for comparison.  Average mobile penetration 
overtook fixed line in 2000.  
It may seem natural to assume that the maximal level of adoption, 
*M , should be 100%.  
However, some countries in our sample have already achieved a mobile penetration rate 
exceeding 100% in recent years, probably due to multiple-subscriptions with different networks 
(e.g. separate private and work mobiles).  In the absence of a natural saturation point, we 
sensitivity-test different values for a common saturation level in two ways.  We set various levels 
of * 100%M   then ensure that observed penetration never reaches *M  either by withholding 
observations of 
*
itMobPen M  or by capping them at a level 
*M .  More precisely, we either 
excluded observations at or above given ‘saturation’ thresholds (100, 150 and 200), or fixed the 
ceiling at 100 and capped observed penetration rates at or above the ceiling at 99.  In our 
econometrics, we find that neither the values nor the significance of estimated coefficients are 
substantially changed by using these alternatives.  For convenience, in the text we only report 
results for M*=100 and exclude observations with penetration greater than 99%.  Sensitivity tests 
are reported in Appendix D-2 
                                               
16 ‘Catch-up’ may incorporate, for example, international demonstration effects and technological improvements. 
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Fig. 2 near here 
Market structure is measured by the number of mobile network operators (N).
17
  The average 
number grew from 1.2 to 3.8 over the period (see Table 1).  Most national mobile network 
markets were a monopoly in 1991 (see Appendix B).  The number of duopolies grew until 1998, 
peaking at 19 countries.  The last three monopolies were eliminated a year later and by 2000, 19 
out of the 30 countries had at least three operators.  By 2006, there were only three duopolies left 
(including China).  As described in the previous section, we investigate possible non-
monotoncity of the effect of market structure by constructing a set of dummy variables.   
Tables 1 and 2 near here 
Just 17% of mobile network operators were private in 1991 but this grew to 90% by 2003 
(see Table 1).  The year in which mobile providers were privatized in each country is given in 
Table 2, with 14 countries privatizing in 1996-98.
1
  Privatization (Prv) is measured as a dummy 
variable that equals one if at least 50% of assets were held by the private sector for the full year, 
and equals zero otherwise.
1
  We require a full year of privatization both because the change of 
ownership may take place late in a year and because it may take some months to have an effect.  
We adopt the same principle for the establishment of an independent regulator and entry or exit 
of a network operator.  Since the most recent full privatization, which was of the Korean mobile 
market in 2002, there are only three countries (i.e. China, Mexico and Turkey) where the mobile 
incumbents are still state-owned.  
We define a regulator as independent only if it is backed by legislation and can claim 
operational decision-making independent of any other government bodies.
18
  As can be seen 
from Table 1, the establishment of an independent regulator is fairly closely related to 
privatization, but there are some significant differences in timing.  An equal number (eleven) 
were established before and after privatization, though four of the latter were before the start of 
our sample (see Table 2).  Four independent regulators were established in the same year as 
privatization and four countries have yet to establish an independent regulator.  Independent 
regulation (IndReg) is measured as a dummy variable that equals one if present and zero 
otherwise.  
                                               
17 The information on the actual number of mobile network operators (MNOs) in each national market year-by-
year are collected from the OECD (for data from 1990 to 2000) and from countries’ telecom regulators’ websites as 
well as from some MNOs’ websites (for data from 2000 to 2006).  See OECD report: 
DSTI/ICCP/TISP(99)11/FINAL, online available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/42/2538118.pdf  
18 The information on the year and conditions when an independent regulatory authority was established in each 
country are extracted from the ITU-BDT online telecom regulatory database. Available on: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ICTEYE/Regulators/Regulators.aspx#.  
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In Appendix A, we provide a stylised graph of how market penetration is related to various 
combinations of these features of the market environment.  The largest steps appear to be 
associated with independent regulation.  However, extreme caution is required in interpreting 
this graph because it takes no account of the way these features tend to evolve over time.  This is 
crucial because penetration also evolves over time independently of any change in, say, 
regulation. 
For reasons explained in the previous section, we include two time trends in our 
econometrics.  Timeopen ( 1it T  ) is country-specific and starts with the first full year that the 
market opened.  This picks up the core national diffusion process as late adopters follow 
pioneers into the market.  Time (= t) picks up international influences as late-starting countries 
catch-up. 
 The principal demand-side variable explaining adoption and diffusion is per capita GDP, 
GDPpc.
19
  We expect to observe positive income effects. Prices are excluded from our core 
model in order to focus on the effect of market structure.  Complex pricing schemes also make it 
difficult to summarise price effects in a single number.  However, we go on to investigate one 
dimension of price in order to gain insight into one of the mechanisms through which market 
structure effects may operate. Data are available for ‘standard’ calls and we use this to examine 
the extent to which market structure and regulation effects operate through price level as distinct 
from the other elements of the consumer offer. 
Mobile service price (MobPrice) is measured by the cost of 3-minute local call.
20
  The 
mobile call price was relatively stable 1991-97, then declined sharply until 2001, after which it 
began to rise again (see Table 2).  Over the full period, there has been an average annual 
decrease of 2% pa.  The average fixed-line price of a 3-minute local call FLPrice (as reported by 
ITU) is also included to test for possible complementarities or a substitution effect between fixed 
and mobile usages.  Complementarities may arise early in the diffusion process because fixed 
line termination opportunities are relatively important for a subscriber.  As mobile penetration 
increases, however, mobile-to-mobile calls become more important and the substitution effect 
with fixed line services may dominate.   
When mobile price is included directly in our model, we adopt instrumental variable 
estimation methods to take account of the likely endogeneity of MobPrice due to strategies used 
by firms to encourage early uptake.  We include three variables as instruments for identification: 
lagged mobile service price (i.e., the mobile service price of the previous year); mobile labour 
                                               
19 Data are taken from the International Monetary Fund. 
20 This is also as reported by the ITU.  Prices are adjusted by the current exchange rate (USD$) and inflation.   
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productivity (i.e. the number of mobile phone subscribers served per person employed in the 
mobile service segment) as an inverted cost driver; and national population (Pop) to capture 
potential market size and possible economies of scale. 
 
5. Empirical results and discussion 
The results from four variants of our model are presented in Table 3.  Hausman tests rejected 
variable effects in favour of fixed effects, so all reported results were estimated with fixed 
effects.  Models 3 and 4 include call prices and are estimated by instrumental variable FE.
 21
  A 
summary of the variables and their definitions is given in Appendix C. 
Model 1 is our core model as specified in equation (4).  Market structures with two, three and 
five firms each have a significantly faster diffusion rate as compared with monopoly.  Triopoly is 
the fastest, with pentopoly and duopoly roughly equal next best.
22
  The strong significance of 
these market structures is robust across specifications, as is the insignificance of tetropoly.
23
  
Market structures with six or seven firms are, if anything, slower than the monopoly diffusion 
rate, but these coefficients are mostly statistically insignificant.
 24
 
The quantitative significance of market structure is substantial and depends on the current 
level of mobile penetration.
25
  Estimated 3 1 0.29   , so triopoly penetrates the market at a 
maximum of 7.3 percentage points faster than monopoly ceteris paribus when penetration is 
around 50%, and 4.7 percentage points faster when penetration is around either 20% or 80%. 
Table 3 near here 
Privatisation is a strongly significant and positive influence on mobile diffusion.  In the 
absence of an independent regulator, a coefficient of 0.18 translates into an incremental boost to 
the diffusion rate of 4.5 percentage points when penetration is around 50%, and of 2.9 
percentage points at penetration of 20% or 80%.  The benefit of privatisation is almost halved if 
there is already an independent regulator.  We find a quantitatively smaller impact of 
                                               
21 We test for the endogeneity of price by applying the Hausman specification test for panel instrumental models 
(Hausman, 1978; Hausman and Taylor, 1981). 
22 F-tests on Model 1 find that the coefficient associated with triopoly is significantly higher than that of duopoly, 
with F =10.69 >F(1, 405)=3.84; whereas, there is no significant difference between the coefficients of triopoly and 
pentopoly (F = 1.34).  
23 We have been unable to explain the latter. 
24 Note also that all but one of our observations of six or seven firm market structures are for the USA, with 
Canada in 2006 being the other one. 
25
 This can be seen by noting: 
100
[ ][100 ]it
MobPenit it
it
dMobPen dy
MobPen
dx dx
  . 
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independent regulation in the absence of privatisation and, in the Model 1 specification, little 
incremental impact of independent regulation in the presence of privatised firms.  Model 2 
includes an interaction between independent regulation and the number of firms to test for the 
influence of market structure on the efficacy of regulation.  We find a positive coefficient which 
suggests that, within the range of observed firm numbers, regulation is made more effective 
when the regulator is able to use rival operators as benchmarks to reduce the asymmetry of 
information between regulator and regulated.
26
 For example, with three firms: the marginal 
effect of independent regulation in the absence of privatisation is almost exactly the same as the 
marginal effect of privatisation without independent regulation; and the regulation effect is 
halved in the presence of privatisation. 
In both models 1 and 2, per capita income has a surprisingly negative effect on the early 
adoption of mobile telephony.  Both the elapsed time since the market opened (Timeopen) and 
the common time trend (Time) are highly significant.  The former picks up the underlying 
diffusion process while the latter implies catch-up in the form of faster diffusion in late-starting 
countries. 
Models 3 and 4 investigate call price effects.  We did not expect strong results given the 
difficulty of summarising complex pricing plans in a single price.  Nevertheless, we do find a 
significant and quantitatively relevant negative own-price effect on the rate of take-up of 
mobiles.  There is also an interesting, if not particularly robust, fixed line effect.  The positive 
coefficient suggests a substitution effect between fixed lines and mobiles, but this is only 
marginally significant.  We also tested for a changing role of fixed lines over time by allowing 
1 2 1F F F
i it T        .  As discussed in section 4, we expected fixed lines to be 
complementary to mobiles in the early years, but to evolve into substitutes over time as more 
people can be called mobile-to-mobile; i.e. we expect 
1 0F   and 2 0F  .  Our results are 
presented in Appendix D-1.  We find some weak support for this hypothesis, with fixed lines 
becoming substitutes for mobiles after seven or eight years.
27
 
Comparing the results with and without prices (i.e. Models 1 and 2 with Models 3 and 4), we 
find that the significance of the market structure variables is largely unchanged, and there is only 
a marginal fall in the size of the duopoly and triopoly coefficients.  This suggests that mobile call 
                                               
26 We also investigated a quadratic effect for the interaction between firm numbers and independent regulation, 
expecting to find a maximum impact of independent regulation with a small number of firms, above which 
competition would negate the value of regulation.  However, both the linear and quadratic terms were positive and 
insignificant. 
27 However, the statistical significance of fixed line prices is not robust to the exclusion of China from the sample. 
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price is not a major component of the competition effect on diffusion – other dimensions of 
competition such as price structure, investment in quality and better service appear more 
important.  The latter are the elements of the offer that may be harder to regulate than a standard 
price.  Consistent with this interpretation, the size and significance of the independent regulation 
variables diminishes when prices are included.  It is as if regulation can substitute for basic price 
competition better than it can for non-price-level effects. 
We conducted a number of robustness tests.  First, we checked to see whether the exclusion 
of China, our single non-OECD country, would affect our results (see Table 4).  Given China’s 
duopolistic market structure, particular interest focuses on the duopoly variable, but the 
exclusion of China makes no difference to the duopoly coefficient either quantitatively or in 
statistical significance.  The same applies to other variables in the model, with the single 
exception of fixed line prices which tend lose significance when China is excluded.   
Table 4 near here 
Second, we tested the smooth transition restrictions embodied in the construction of our 
market structure variables.  These cannot be rejected for any specification (see Appendix D-2).  
Third, we tested a range of alternative assumptions about maximum penetration.  Our results 
remain robust to the range of specifications set out in section 4 (see Appendix D-3).  
Finally, although the number of mobile network operators is determined by spectrum 
constraints and regulators in all countries, we tested for the possible endogeneity of the number 
of firms.  We should expect the number of operators to be positively associated with the potential 
size of the market if market structure was relevantly endogenous to the diffusion process.  
However, we found no evidence that the number of operators was determined by the size of 
market, even when excluding China (see Appendix D-4). 
 
6. Conclusions  
The aim of this paper was to identify the structural features of the market that provide the 
best competitive environment to maximise the market penetration of a new product – mobile 
telephony.  Unlike earlier studies, we are able to use data that covers the core period of the 
diffusion process. We find a non-monotonic effect of market structure on mobile penetration.  
Like earlier studies, we confirm the benefit of moving from monopoly to duopoly, but the 
advantage of using more recent data is that we now have experience of a much wider range of 
market structures.  This reveals that triopoly is a major competitive improvement on duopoly but 
there is no further improvement in diffusion with more firms.  
It is interesting to relate this to the wider empirical literature that relates market structure and 
competitive outcomes. Much of this now exploits data on local geographical markets to 
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investigate the implied effects of competition on margins, price and productivity.
28
  An emerging 
stylised fact is that a relatively small number of firms, often between two and four depending on 
the product, is sufficient to generate most of the benefits of competition in traditional 
homogeneous product markets (e.g. professional services, retailing, concrete).  That research 
uses genuinely local markets (compared with national markets in this paper) to provide the cross-
section dimension.  It also investigates totally different dependent variables.  Nevertheless, our 
results feed into the emerging stylised fact for relatively homogeneous product markets. 
However, there is an important difference between mobile networks and more traditional 
markets because spectrum limitations have been addressed by strict licensing of operators.  This 
eliminates the threat of entry as a mechanism by which competition works.  The institutional 
response has been that mobile networks are typically regulated, though the independence of the 
regulator has varied across countries and over time.  We find that the independence of the 
regulator has a positive role to play in addition to market structure, and that this role is more 
effective when the regulator is able to observe a greater number of rival operators.  In line with 
some of the earlier literature, privatisation also has a substantial impact particularly in the 
absence of independent regulation. 
Our findings are consistent with the view that a balance needs to be struck between 
investment incentives for network industries characterised by large sunk costs and the benefits of 
an apparently more competitive market structure.  This is particularly relevant when determining 
the number of spectrum licenses to be granted, but it is also relevant for merger policy.  Our 
findings are consistent with the view that three private firms are sufficient to maximise the 
incentive to invest in a network, but independent regulation is also necessary to guard against 
collusion possibilities or unilateral market power.  
Another of our findings is that market structure still matters when we control for the standard 
price of a call.  This confirms that competition is multidimensional, and that price level is only 
one element of the product offer that is influenced by structure and influential on consumer 
uptake.   
Finally, the data in this paper covers the core period of diffusion in thirty countries.  Average 
market penetration across these countries rose from less than 2% to nearly 97% in sixteen years.  
As the market matures, the consumer focus naturally turns to usage and product development.  
Future research could usefully identify whether the features of the market we have found to be 
important for uptake are different to those necessary for an efficient mature market. 
                                               
28 For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Manuszak and Moul (2008) and Syverson (2004). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Cross-Country Trends in Telecoms in 30 Countries (1991-2006) 
year 
Mobile 
penetration 
% 
Fixed-line 
penetration 
% 
Mobile 
price of 3-
min local 
call (USD) 
Number 
MNOs 
Mobile 
incumbents 
privatized 
Independent 
regulator 
established 
Privatization 
& Independent 
regulator 
Mean 
1991 1.66 39.21 1.36 1.2 17% 20% 10% 
1992 2.11 40.40 1.44 1.2 20% 20% 10% 
1993 2.88 41.60 1.38 1.5 23% 23% 10% 
1994 4.49 42.84 1.40 1.6 27% 27% 10% 
1995 7.14 44.10 1.42 1.8 33% 30% 10% 
1996 11.03 45.53 1.45 1.9 37% 30% 13% 
1997 15.91 47.38 1.31 2.2 50% 37% 23% 
1998 24.22 48.27 1.22 2.4 60% 60% 37% 
1999 37.57 49.79 1.04 2.9 83% 67% 57% 
2000 52.87 50.83 0.94 3.1 83% 70% 60% 
2001 63.85 50.47 0.77 3.5 87% 80% 70% 
2002 70.09 50.09 0.89 3.4 87% 83% 73% 
2003 76.15 49.30 0.99 3..5 90% 87% 80% 
2004 83.72 48.81 0.98 3.5 90% 87% 80% 
2005 90.30 47.34 1.00 3.7 90% 87% 80% 
2006 96.79 46.87 1.00 3.8 90% 87% 80% 
Average annual 
change rate 
33% 1% -2% 8% 12% 11% 17% 
Data source: based on a variety of sources, including ITU database on the world telecommunication/ICT indicators (2006), ITU-BDT online 
regulatory information database, OECD regulatory database (2000), countries’ telecom regulators’ websites and mobile network operators’ 
websites. See text for details. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Mobile Sector Reforms by County 
Country 
Year 
incumbents 
privatized 
Year 
independent 
regulator 
established  
Number 
MNOs in 
2006 
Country 
Year 
incumbents 
privatized 
Year 
independent 
regulator 
established  
Number 
MNOs in 
2006 
Australia 1997 1997 4 Japan always n/a 5 
Austria 1998 1997 4 Korea 2002 1997 3 
Belgium 1996 1993 5 Luxemburg 1998 1997 3 
Canada always 1976 6 Mexico n/a 1996 4 
China  n/a n/a 2 Netherlands 1994 1997 5 
Czech Republic 1994 2000 4 New Zealand always 2001 2 
Denmark 1991 dep. 4 Norway 1998 1987 2 
Finland 1998 1988 4 Poland 1998 2000 3 
France 1997 1997 4 Portugal 1995 1989 3 
Germany 1996 1998 4 Spain 1992 1996 3 
Greece 1996 1992 3 Sweden 2000 1992 4 
Hungary 1993 1999 3 Switzerland 1998 dep. 4 
Iceland 1997 1997 4 Turkey n/a 2000 3 
Ireland 1996 2002 4 UK always 1984 5 
Italy 1998 1998 4 US always 1934 6 
Data source: author compiled based on a variety of sources, including ITU-BDT online regulatory information database, 
countries’ telecom regulators’ websites and mobile network operators’ websites. See text. 
1. N/A: event yet to occur; 
2. Dep.: a separate regulator is subject to several other governmental bodies in its decision making; 
3. Privatization is recorded for those where at least 50% of assets of state-owned companies have been sold to private sector;  
    Independent regulator is recorded only if it is created backed by legislation and claims to be independent of decision making.  
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Table 3: Estimation Results under Panel Equation-by-Equation and Panel Instrumental Approaches 
 Dependent variable: yit = ln(MobPenit/(100-MobPenit)) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Market structure: 
N=2 0.1822*** 0.2028*** 0.1462** 0.1771** 
 2.31 2.63 1.85 2.27 
N=3 0.2934*** 0.2914*** 0.2739*** 0.2846*** 
 3.52 3.58 3.22 3.41 
N=4 -0.0233 -0.0318 -0.0589 -0.0554 
 -0.29 -0.41 -0.74 -0.71 
N=5 0.2157*** 0.1392* 0.2146*** 0.1542** 
 2.45 1.59 2.39 1.73 
N=6 -0.4217** -0.1176 -0.4299** -0.1547 
 -1.86 -0.51 -1.94 -0.68 
N=7 -0.0984 -0.2580*** -0.1477* -0.2840*** 
 -1.04 -2.62 -1.56 -2.91 
Ownership: 
PrvT 0.1817*** 0.1932*** 0.1685*** 0.1814*** 
 6.01 6.53 5.63 6.14 
Independent regulator: 
IndRegT 0.1011*** 0.0600*** 0.0620** 0.0335 
 3.67 2.12 2.04 1.10 
IR*PrvT -0.0781*** -0.0900*** -0.0323 -0.0524** 
 -3.20 -3.75 -1.11 -1.80 
IR*NT  0.0403***  0.0364*** 
  4.61  4.15 
Other: 
lnGDPpctT1 -0.1134*** -0.1066*** -0.1136*** -0.1068*** 
 -6.49 -6.23 -6.63 -6.33 
Timeopen 0.3793*** 0.3931*** 0.3438*** 0.3695*** 
 4.46 4.73 4.02 4.39 
Time 1.4079*** 1.3171*** 1.4562*** 1.3571*** 
 7.21 6.88 7.58 7.14 
lnMobPricetT1   -0.0591*** -0.0500** 
   -2.40 -2.05 
lnFixedPricetT1   0.1960** 0.1261 
   1.86 1.20 
  n = 447 n = 447 n = 447 n = 447 
 
R-sq = 0.9394 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9424 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9426 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9450 
(within) 
Estimation Procedure FE FE FEIV FEIV 
Note: In all models, ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; z-statistics are reported below 
each coefficient in italic type.  
Estimation: Models (1) and (2) are estimated by standard fixed-effects (FE). Models (3) and (4) are estimated by panel fixed-
effects instrumental estimation (FEIV) with MobPrice endogenous.  
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Table 4: Estimation Results (excl. China) under Panel Equation-by-Equation and Panel Instrumental Approaches  
Dependent variable: yit = ln(MobPenit/(100-MobPenit)) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Market structure: 
N=2 0.1861*** 0.2073*** 0.1447** 0.1757** 
 2.33 2.66 1.80 2.23 
N=3 0.2982*** 0.2965*** 0.2704*** 0.2808*** 
 3.54 3.62 3.14 3.33 
N=4 -0.0232 -0.0321 -0.0634 -0.0606 
 -0.29 -0.41 -0.79 -0.77 
N=5 0.2146*** 0.1348* 0.2061** 0.1432* 
 2.41 1.53 2.26 1.58 
N=6 -0.4475** -0.1359 -0.4531** -0.1733 
 -1.95 0.58 -2.02 -0.76 
N=7 -0.1007 -0.2666*** -0.1498* -0.2902** 
 -1.05 -2.68 -1.57 -2.95 
Ownership: 
PrvT 0.1927*** 0.2069*** 0.1783*** 0.1929*** 
 5.96 6.55 5.53 6.07 
Independent regulator: 
IndRegT 0.1116*** 0.0710*** 0.0694** 0.0412* 
 3.81 2.38 2.15 1.29 
IR*PrvT -0.0853*** -0.0987*** -0.0374 -0.0583** 
 -3.41 -4.02 -1.25 -1.95 
IR*NT  0.0417***  0.0373*** 
  4.73  4.21 
Other: 
lnGDPpctT1 -0.1013*** -0.0932*** -0.1022*** -0.0944*** 
 -5.50 -5.17 -5.67 -5.32 
Timeopen 0.3843*** 0.4002*** 0.3413*** 0.3680*** 
 4.43 4.74 3.93 4.32 
Time 1.2670*** 1.1598*** 1.3263*** 1.2151*** 
 6.17 5.76 6.58 6.10 
lnMobPricetT1   -0.0586*** -0.0497** 
   -2.36 -2.03 
lnFixedPricetT1   0.2296** 0.1621* 
   2.13 1.52 
  n = 431 n = 431 n = 431 n = 431 
 
R-sq = 0.9375 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9409 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9411 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9434 
(within) 
Estimation Procedure FE FE FEIV FEIV 
Note: In all models, ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; z-statistics are reported below 
each coefficient in italic type.  
Estimation: Models (1) and (2) are estimated by standard fixed-effects (FE). Models (3) and (4) are estimated by panel fixed-
effects instrumental estimation (FEIV) with MobPrice endogenous.  
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 Figure 1: Market structure and diffusion (illustrative) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Growth of mobile network penetration 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Mobile Penetration by Regulatory Practice
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P: the mobile market is characterized by private monopoly, without an independent regulator; 
C: the mobile market is characterized by public ownership and operates in a ‘competitive environment’ 
(i.e. N>2, without an independent regulator; 
PIR: the mobile market is characterized by private monopoly, with an independent regulator; 
CIR: the mobile market is characterized by public ownership and operates in a ‘competitive 
environment’, with an independent regulator; 
CP: the mobile market is characterized by private ownership and operates in a ‘competitive 
environment’, without an independent regulator; 
CPIR: the mobile market is characterized by private ownership and operates in a ‘competitive 
environment’, with an independent regulator. 
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Appendix B  
 
 
The Number of Mobile Network Operators by Country from 1991 to 2006 
 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1 China 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 Australia 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 
3 Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 
4 Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 5 
5 Canada 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 
6 Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 
7 Denmark 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 
8 Finland 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
9 France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 
10 Germany 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
11 Greece 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
12 Hungary 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 
13 Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 
14 Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 
15 Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
16 Japan 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
17 Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
18 Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
19 Mexico 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
20 Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
21 New Zealand 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
22 Norway 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
23 Poland 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
24 Portugal 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
25 Spain 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
26 Sweden 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
27 Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
28 Turkey 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
29 United Kingdom 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 
30 United States 2 2 2 2 2 3 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 
  Total 36 36 44 49 55 58 67 73 88 94 104 103 104 106 112 114 
  Average 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8 
Data source: compiled by author based on a variety of sources, including OECD regulatory database, countries’ telecom regulators’ websites and mobile network operators’ website
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Appendix C 
 
 
Summary of Variables 
 
  Ab. Description Source 
Dependent variable yit 
Logistically transformed 
number of mobile subscribers 
per 100 inhabitants 
ITU 
Reform variables 
Nit 
number of mobile network 
operators, used to set entry 
dummies 
ITU, WB, OECD, regulators’ 
& MNOs’ websites 
IndRegit 
dummy variable for independent 
regulator: 1, if created backed by 
legislation and independent of 
decisions making; 0, otherwise;  
Prvit 
dummy variable for privatization: 
1, if at least 50% of assets held 
by private sector; 0, otherwise;  
IR*Nit 
interaction of independent 
regulation & the number of 
firms; 
IR*Pit 
Interaction of privatization & 
independent regulation; 
Exogenous control 
variables 
lnFLPriceit 
fixed-line price of 3-minute local 
call;  
ITU 
lnGDPpcit per capita GDP;  IMF 
t time trend;   
Instrumented 
variable 
lnMobPriceit 
mobile price of 3-minute local 
call 
ITU 
Additional 
instrumental 
variables 
lnPopit total national population;  WBG-HNP 
lnMblpit 
The number of mobile 
subscribers served per mobile 
staff 
ITU & MII 
lnL1MobPriceit 
1-lagged mobile price of 3-
minute local call 
ITU 
Note: All explanatory variables are in logarithmic form, except for time trend and dummies. 
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Appendix D-1: Time-dependent fixed line price effect 
 
  Including China Excluding China 
Market structure:   
N=2 0.1306** 0.1612** 0.1333** 0.1645** 
 1.66 2.08 1.67 2.09 
N=3 0.2641*** 0.2748*** 0.2637*** 0.2743*** 
 3.13 3.32 3.07 3.26 
N=4 -0.0924 -0.0874 -0.0885 -0.0831 
 -1.17 -1.13 -1.10 -1.05 
N=5 0.1713** 0.1151* 0.1738** 0.1160* 
 1.90 1.28 1.89 1.28 
N=6 -0.3877** -0.1248 -0.4108** -0.1445 
 -1.76 -0.55 -1.84 -0.63 
N=7 -0.1603** -0.2907*** -0.1582** -0.2930*** 
 -1.71 -3.00 -1.67 -2.98 
Ownership:   
PrvT 0.1974 0.2085*** 0.1981*** 0.2103*** 
 6.29 6.75 5.93 6.40 
Independent regulator:   
IndRegT 0.0705 0.0429* 0.0741** 0.0465* 
 2.32 1.41 2.30 1.45 
IR*PrvT -0.0274 -0.0471* -0.0324 -0.0534** 
 -0.95 -1.63 -1.09 -1.79 
IR*NT  0.0350***  0.0361*** 
   4.02  4.08 
Other:   
lnGDPpctT1 -0.1563*** -0.1477*** -0.1402*** -0.1288*** 
 -6.98 -6.70 -5.63 -5.24 
Timeopen 0.3811*** 0.4040*** 0.3719*** 0.3946*** 
 4.44 4.79 4.24 4.59 
Time 1.8840*** 1.7678*** 1.7112*** 1.5644*** 
 7.87 7.48 6.43 5.94 
lnMobPricetT1 -0.0709*** -0.0614*** -0.0672*** -0.0573*** 
 -2.90 -2.54 -2.69 -2.33 
lnFixedPricetT1 -0.4565** -0.4923** -0.3088 -0.3197 
 -1.85 -2.04 -1.15 -1.22 
lnFixedPricetT1sq 0.0303*** 0.0289*** 0.0244** 0.0220** 
 2.95 2.86 2.20 2.01 
  n = 447 n = 447 n = 431 n = 431 
 
R-sq = 0.9436 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9460 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9414 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9440 
(within) 
Estimation Procedure FEIV FEIV FEIV FEIV 
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Appendix D-2: Joint significant test for model specification  
 
 
Standard F-test: 
Unrestricted Model 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       447 
Group variable: country_code                    Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9406                         Obs per group: min =        11 
       between = 0.0037                                        avg =      14.9 
       overall = 0.7662                                        max =        16 
 
                                                F(21,396)          =    298.67 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1021                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           y |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     dumNoF2 |   .6505017   .2294478     2.84   0.005     .1994137     1.10159 
     dumNoF3 |   .1155003   .3791463     0.30   0.761    -.6298909    .8608915 
     dumNoF4 |  -.0679834   .4828393    -0.14   0.888    -1.017232    .8812654 
     dumNoF5 |   2.403331   .9072008     2.65   0.008     .6197992    4.186863 
     dumNoF6 |   .9670847   1.032365     0.94   0.349    -1.062517    2.996686 
     dumNoF7 |   1.305356   1.851042     0.71   0.481    -2.333741    4.944453 
         Prv |   .5001617   .2807797     1.78   0.076    -.0518435    1.052167 
      IndReg |   .4784884   .2760584     1.73   0.084    -.0642349    1.021212 
   itcIndPrv |  -.3892514   .4050173    -0.96   0.337    -1.185504    .4070014 
     lnGDPpc |   .5021703   .5182983     0.97   0.333      -.51679    1.521131 
      dumN2t |   -.007805   .0463616    -0.17   0.866    -.0989506    .0833406 
      dumN3t |   .1112333   .0545214     2.04   0.042     .0040458    .2184209 
      dumN4t |   .0818464   .0565853     1.45   0.149    -.0293988    .1930915 
      dumN5t |  -.0798601   .0806627    -0.99   0.323    -.2384408    .0787207 
      dumN6t |  -.0990981   .0885009    -1.12   0.264    -.2730884    .0748922 
      dumN7t |  -.1338679   .1641095    -0.82   0.415    -.4565027    .1887669 
        Prvt |  -.0313775   .0447403    -0.70   0.484    -.1193356    .0565807 
     IndRegt |  -.0854706   .0404026    -2.12   0.035    -.1649011   -.0060402 
  itcIndPrvt |   .1161292   .0495007     2.35   0.019     .0188122    .2134461 
    lnGDPpcT |  -.0989183   .0219415    -4.51   0.000    -.1420547    -.055782 
           t |   1.437561    .221735     6.48   0.000     1.001636    1.873485 
       _cons |  -10.86474   4.904024    -2.22   0.027    -20.50592   -1.223561 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.1860362 
     sigma_e |  .65449683 
         rho |  .76656409   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(29, 396) =    12.06             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
Restricted Core Model 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       447 
Group variable: country_code                    Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9394                         Obs per group: min =        11 
       between = 0.2986                                        avg =      14.9 
       overall = 0.1926                                        max =        16 
 
                                                F(12,405)          =    523.28 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7316                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           y |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          N2 |   .1821789    .078856     2.31   0.021     .0271607    .3371971 
          N3 |   .2934269   .0832961     3.52   0.000     .1296802    .4571736 
          N4 |   -.023275   .0794031    -0.29   0.770    -.1793688    .1328188 
          N5 |   .2157196   .0880878     2.45   0.015     .0425532     .388886 
          N6 |  -.4217322   .2265503    -1.86   0.063    -.8670935    .0236292 
          N7 |   -.098461   .0945685    -1.04   0.298    -.2843673    .0874454 
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        PrvT |   .1816734   .0302353     6.01   0.000     .1222357     .241111 
     IndRegT |   .1011156   .0275704     3.67   0.000     .0469166    .1553146 
  itcIndPrvT |   -.078136   .0244475    -3.20   0.002     -.126196   -.0300761 
  lnGDPpctT1 |  -.1133781   .0174702    -6.49   0.000    -.1477217   -.0790345 
         tt1 |   .3793468   .0851389     4.46   0.000     .2119774    .5467161 
           t |   1.407879   .1951713     7.21   0.000     1.024204    1.791554 
       _cons |  -3.744138   .6854233    -5.46   0.000     -5.09157   -2.396707 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   3.560193 
     sigma_e |  .65369414 
         rho |  .96738616   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(29, 405) =    23.44             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
( ) / (0.9406 0.9394) / 9
0.8889
(1 ) / ( 1) (1 0.9406) / (447 (21 29) 1)
u r
u u
R R r
F statistic
R N k
 
   
      
 
 
Therefore, joint significance test: F-statistic = 0.8889< F(9,396)=1.94; we cannot reject the 
restricted model, so the restricted model specification is preferred.  
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Appendix D-3: Sensitivity check for different thresholds of mobile penetration 
 
 
  Ceiling at 100 Ceiling at 150 Ceiling at 200 Ceiling capped at 99 
Market structure: 
N=2 0.1822*** 0.1280** 0.1285*** 0.1628** 
 2.31 2.30 2.53 2.02 
N=3 0.2934*** 0.1337** 0.1433** 0.2829*** 
 3.52 2.10 2.17 3.36 
N=4 -0.0233 -0.0220 -0.0161 0.0037 
 -0.29 -0.37 -0.28 0.05 
N=5 0.2157*** 0.0621 0.0620 0.1773** 
 2.45 0.95 0.97 1.96 
N=6 -0.4217** -0.1083 -0.0203 -0.6232*** 
 -1.86 -0.62 -0.12 -2.59 
N=7 -0.0984 -0.0334 -0.0152 -0.1250 
 -1.04 -0.44 -0.21 -1.19 
Ownership: 
PrvT 0.1817*** 0.1207*** 0.1061*** 0.1907*** 
 6.01 5.08 4.59 5.80 
Independent regulator: 
IndRegT 0.1011*** 0.0516*** 0.0425** 0.1026*** 
 3.67 2.38 2.01 3.41 
IR*PrvT -0.0781*** -0.0720*** -0.0712*** -0.0777*** 
 -3.20 -3.70 -3.75 -2.88 
Other: 
lnGDPpctT1 -0.1134*** -0.1619*** -0.1661*** -0.0776*** 
 -6.49 -12.86 -13.84 -4.54 
Timeopen 0.3793*** 0.3398*** 0.3442*** 0.3718*** 
 4.46 5.42 5.64 4.28 
Time 1.4079*** 1.9311*** 1.9571*** 1.0646*** 
 7.21 13.61 14.47 5.53 
  n = 447 n = 475 n = 477 n = 477 
 
R-sq = 0.9394 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9427 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9394 
(within) 
R-sq = 0.9365  
(within) 
Estimation Procedure FE FE FE FE 
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Appendix D-4: Number of firms and potential market size 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       478 
Group variable: country_code                    Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7284                         Obs per group: min =        14 
       between = 0.1850                                        avg =      15.9 
       overall = 0.3553                                        max =        16 
 
                                                F(5,443)           =    237.61 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7354                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnNoF |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lnGDPpc |  -.1666108   .1565375    -1.06   0.288    -.4742591    .1410375 
       lnPop |   .3090859   .5548317     0.56   0.578    -.7813434    1.399515 
         Prv |   .1517693   .0425212     3.57   0.000     .0682009    .2353378 
      IndReg |   .1118349   .0414607     2.70   0.007     .0303508     .193319 
           t |   .0754698   .0087876     8.59   0.000     .0581993    .0927403 
       _cons |  -3.485755   9.206409    -0.38   0.705    -21.57942    14.60791 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .52336633 
     sigma_e |  .25048085 
         rho |  .81363404   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(29, 443) =     7.03             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
Excluding China 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       462 
Group variable: country_code                    Number of groups   =        29 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7316                         Obs per group: min =        14 
       between = 0.4526                                        avg =      15.9 
       overall = 0.5672                                        max =        16 
 
                                                F(5,428)           =    233.37 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5695                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnNoF |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lnGDPpc |  -.0152608   .2134314    -0.07   0.943     -.434765    .4042434 
       lnPop |   .2630333   .5576969     0.47   0.637    -.8331323    1.359199 
         Prv |   .1413675   .0434453     3.25   0.001     .0559748    .2267601 
      IndReg |   .1055272   .0420218     2.51   0.012     .0229325     .188122 
           t |   .0705064     .01027     6.87   0.000     .0503205    .0906923 
       _cons |  -4.116812   9.295393    -0.44   0.658    -22.38711    14.15349 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .31201032 
     sigma_e |  .25151485 
         rho |  .60612877   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(28, 428) =     6.47             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix E: Specification of market structure in the diffusion model  
 
We suppress the regulation and privatisation dummy variables and error terms to focus on the 
construction of the market structure variables. 
it it ity a b t    
0
1
n n
it i it it
n
a x  


     
0
1
n n
it i it it
n
b x  


     
So, 0 0
1 1
n n n n
it i it it i it it
n n
y x x t     
 
 
 
        
 
   
We want to put restrictions on the coefficients such that initial penetration is zero and there are 
no jumps in penetration on further entry.  Penetration is zero both the day before and the day 
after the first entry: 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 10it i it i it i i it i it iy x x T x x T                           
These constraints imply 0 0 1i it i it ix x T          and 
1 1 1
iT   .  Substituting the former: 
0 1
1 1
n n n n
it i it i it it
n n
y x t T t   
 
 
               . 
Substituting the second restriction into the diffusion equation for the monopoly period: 
0 1 1 1
it i it i iy x t T t T                  
 
Similarly, penetration should be the same just before and just after the second entry: 
0 2 1 1 2 1 0 2 1 2 2 2
it i it i i i i i it i i iy x T T T T x T T T                                  . 
So, 2 1 2 1 2 2i i iT T T        
Substituting back into the diffusion equation for the duopoly period: 
0 1 1 2 1 2 2
it i it i i i iy x t T T T t T                         
 
For no jump with the third entrant: 
0 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 0 3 1 3 3 3
it i it i i i i i i i it i i iy x T T T T T T x T T T                                          
So, 
3 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 3
i i i i iT T T T T               
Substituting back into the diffusion equation for the triopoly period: 
0 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 3
it i it i i i i i iy x t T T T T T t T                                
 
For no jump with the n
th
 entrant, 
1
1
1
n
n k k k n n
i i i
k
T T T  



 
     
 
 .  Substituting into the general 
diffusion equation applicable for all periods: 
0 1
1
n n
it i it i it
n
y x t T N  


           , where 
1
1
N
n n n k n n
it it i it i i
k n
N t T T T
 
 
            
 
 . 
 
 
